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COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES:
A PRUDENT SOLUTION TO EXCESSIVE CEO PAY 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of CEO pay continues to garner significant attention 
both in the popular press and among regulators. The New York Times alone 
printed approximately 200 stories dealing with executive compensation in 
the first seven months of 2006.1 Moreover, on July 26, 2006, the SEC 
approved new rules on disclosure of executive compensation.2 Prior to 
approving the new rules, the SEC received more than 20,000 comment 
letters, prompting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox to comment that “no 
issue in the 72 years of the Commission’s history has generated such 
interest.”3 The reason for the intense degree of interest is clear: CEO 
compensation in the U.S. is extremely high, and is getting higher.  In 2003, 
the average CEO of a large U.S. firm made 500 times that of the average 
 
1 Culled from a Westlaw search of The New York Times, conducted on August 1, 
2006, using the search request “ceo or executive w/5 pay or compensation.” 
2 SEC Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to 
Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation 
and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-
123.htm.  The full text of the rules was not available as of August 7, 2006.  See id. 
for a summary of the new rules.  See also infra notes 55 and accompanying text for 
a brief discussion thereof. 
3 See SEC Press Release, supra note 2.  
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worker.4 This compares with 140 times worker salary in 1991.5 In 
absolute levels, the average pay of CEOs in the S&P 500 has risen (in 
constant 2002 dollars) from $3.7 million in 1993 to $9.1 million in 2003.6
One study of executive compensation at publicly traded firms with a 
market capitalization larger than $50 million found that, during the period 
from 2001 to 2003, the top five executives received compensation 
equivalent to 9.8% of the firms’ aggregate earnings.7
Some have argued that, for the good of society, CEOs should not 
be allowed to receive such exorbitant amounts.8 Others take the narrower 
position that, irrespective of the impact on the broader society, excessive 
CEO pay clearly harms shareholders.  Not only must shareholders 
ultimately pay the bill, but to the extent that such pay levels are pervasive 
throughout the market, it becomes difficult for them simply to sell the 
 
4 CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, at 61, quoted in 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1615, 1619 (2005); Janice Revell, Mo’ Money, Fewer Problems; Is it a Good Idea 
to Get Rid of the $1 Million Pay Ceiling?, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2004, at 34, quoted 
in LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004) [hereinafter PWP]. 
5 PWP, supra note 4, at 1. 
6 Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL'Y 283, 285 (2005). 
7 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: An Overview of 
the Issues, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2005). 
8 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, 
What’s the Remedy: The Case for Compensation Discussion and Analysis, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 675 (2005); Mark J. Lowenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation 
SUBMISSION COPY AUGUST 2006 
2006]      COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES 3
shares of any offending companies.  Following the so-called “Wall Street 
Rule” would force investors to exit the entire equity market, an obviously 
untenable response.9
Still, despite overwhelming evidence that CEO pay is extremely 
high, it does not follow that CEO pay is “excessive.”  A figure can only be 
considered excessive if it is higher than the “correct” price, and numerous 
unanswerable questions confront anyone attempting to determine the 
correct price for the services of a CEO.10 For example, how many people 
actually have the necessary skills to be a good CEO?  How much better is a 
given CEO than the other candidates?  How much of the company’s 
success or failure is attributable to the CEO?  What is the “fair” allocation 
of profits as between the CEO and the shareholders?11 In the face of such 
unknowables, one is left with the market.  In short, a fair price for a CEO is 
what the market will bear.  But one can use the market to legitimize 
ostensibly excessive CEO compensation only if the market is “fair,” in the 
sense that it has not been manipulated by the participants.   
 
and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 206-07 
(1996). 
9 Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2000). 
10 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 677; Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO 
Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129 (2003). 
11 Snyder, supra note 10, at 144-46. 
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Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, in their seminal book Pay 
without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
condemn CEO pay for just such manipulation.12 According to Bebchuk 
and Fried, boards of directors and CEOs do not engage in real arms length 
bargaining over CEO pay.  Rather, CEOs exert “managerial power” to 
extract economic rents above and beyond what they could have obtained in 
an arms length negotiation.13 The result is excessive CEO pay, 
insufficiently aligned with the CEO’s performance.  To address the 
problem, Bebchuk and Fried have proposed granting shareholders greater 
power vis-à-vis the board of directors.  For example, they would allow 
large shareholders to nominate candidates for the board, and would require 
the company to pick up the expenses for any proxy fight if the 
shareholder’s nominee received more than a designated minimum level of 
support.   
Bebchuk and Fried’s book has received considerable academic 
attention, with some commentators taking issue with their conclusion that 
CEOs are in fact overpaid, and others objecting to their proposed remedies.  
This paper accepts the fundamental point that the CEO pay-setting process 
is flawed and that reforms are necessary.  Nonetheless, it recognises that 
 
12 See PWP, supra note 4.  
13 Id. at 61-64. 
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high CEO pay may be attributable to numerous factors other than 
managerial power, and it questions whether certain of Bebchuk and Fried’s 
proposed solutions might, by altering the balance of power between 
shareholders and directors, have unintended negative consequences for 
matters beyond CEO pay.  Therefore, to remedy the process problems 
identified by Bebchuk and Fried, this paper proposes that large 
shareholders be allowed to appoint non-executive “compensation 
representatives” to look after the interests of all shareholders on matters 
relating exclusively to CEO pay.  This paper contends that compensation 
representatives could address the most significant problems described in 
Bebchuk and Fried’s book, without fundamentally altering the traditional 
relationship between the shareholders and the board of directors.   As such, 
it would constitute a prudent solution to the problem of excessive CEO 
pay. 
Part I of this paper discusses in detail Bebchuk and Fried’s thesis, as 
well as their suggested reforms.  Part II describes and evaluates a number 
of objections to the managerial power thesis.  Part III discusses the many 
objections to Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal to permit large shareholders to 
place board nominees on the corporate ballot.  Part IV introduces the 
compensation representative approach and outlines its numerous 
advantages over both the current system and the reforms suggested by 
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Bebchuk and Fried.  This paper concludes by raising and responding to 
potential objections to the compensation representative approach. 
 
I. THE MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS 
Ideally, say Bebchuk and Fried, boards and CEOs should engage in 
arms length bargaining over CEO compensation.  In such a scenario, 
boards would vigorously negotiate to receive the best deal for the benefit 
of the company’s shareholders.  In fact, argue Bebchuk and Fried, CEOs 
exert managerial power to ensure that their compensation is superior to 
what they would receive in an arms length bargain.  Bebchuk and Fried 
point to five major factors that enable CEOs to exert managerial power.  
First, although most compensation committees are comprised of 
independent directors, CEOs have significant control over who will serve 
on the board from which the committee members will be drawn.  Although 
exchange rules no longer permit CEOs to serve on the nomination 
committee, a nomination committee is are unlikely to propose directors 
opposed by the CEO.  And CEOs are not likely to support a critic of high 
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executive pay.14 As long-time General Electric CEO Jack Welch told an 
audience of recently appointed CEOs: 
Put someone in charge who is nearing the end of their 
career, so that they’re not jealous of a younger CEO, is 
immensely rich, much richer than you, and enjoys seeing 
other people get rich. . . . Never, ever make a distinguished 
academic your compensation committee chair.  You’ll be a 
poor man by the end of it.15
Warren Buffett, a long-time critic of excessive CEO pay, had in mind a 
similar tendency when he noted that “[t]hough I have served as a director 
of twenty public companies, only one CEO has put me on his 
compensation committee.  Hmmm . . .”16 Second, CEOs are in a position 
to steer benefits to board members, though their ability to do so has been 
reduced by the 2003 changes to listing standards of the major securities 
exchanges.17 Third, social and psychological factors discourage board 
members from bargaining aggressively with CEOs over compensation.  
Friendship, loyalty, and team spirit encourage directors to be pliant, often 
at the expense of the interests of parties, such as shareholders, who are 
 
14 Id. at 26. 
15 See Symposium on Bebchuck & Fried’s Pay Without Performance, The Media 
and Executive Compensation: A Panel Discussion, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 795, 796-
97 (2005) (statement quoted by Matthew Bishop). 
16 Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 17 
(Feb. 28, 2006), (included in the Annual Report to the Shareholders of Berkshire 
Hathaway, Inc.) http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2005ltr.pdf. 
17 PWP, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
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present at the table.18 Also, board members who are highly paid CEOs in 
their own right are likely to rationalize high CEO pay as being in the best 
interests of shareholders.19 A former SEC commissioner described it more 
nefariously as the “giraffe effect”:   
The compensation committee, composed solely of outside 
directors who were CEOs of their own public 
corporations, knew that what goes around comes around.  
Pushing the pay envelope for the CEO who had selected 
them for his board was only natural, since they would not 
want anyone they were associated with to rank in the 
bottom half of surveys, and getting CEOs’ scale up could 
only help them when their scales were reviewed by their 
outside directors.20 
Fourth, since board members typically own only a very small fraction of 
the company’s stock, and since the reputations of directors are unlikely to 
suffer from approving a CEO’s pay package unless the terms of the 
package are truly egregious, directors who comply with CEO pay demands 
will usually not pay a high financial or reputational cost.21 Finally, the 
limits to board members’ time and information all but compel them to rely 
on the advice provided by the company’s human resources department and 
 
18 Id. at 32. 
19 Id. at 31-34. 
20 Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critique of Pay without Performance, 30 IOWA 
J. CORP. L. 767, 769 (2005). 
21 PWP, supra note 4, at 34-36.  
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the compensation consultants that have traditionally been hired by that 
department.22
Bebchuk and Fried argue that existing mechanisms cannot effectively 
constrain pay in the face of managerial power.  Litigation’s effectiveness is 
blunted both by the procedural hurdles placed in front of shareholder 
plaintiffs and by the extremely high standard applied to challenges to 
executive compensation.23 In effect, plaintiffs must either establish that (i) 
when nominally independent directors approved CEO compensation, they 
were in fact engaged in a self-dealing transaction for their own personal 
benefit, or (ii) the compensation scheme constituted “waste,” i.e., it was so 
egregious that no rational person could have approved it.24 
The difficulty of using shareholder litigation to challenge 
extraordinary pay was recently confirmed in the Delaware case In re Walt 
 
22 Id. at 36-37.  As discussed infra note 128 and accompanying text, NYSE rules 
now require that a compensation committee’s charter give the committee sole 
power to retain and fire the compensation consultant.  Still, a compensation 
committee will likely make its decision based in part on the recommendation of the 
firm’s human resources department, which is ultimately responsible to the CEO. 
23 Id. at 45-48. 
24 The difficulty of prevailing in a waste claim was colorfully expressed thus by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery:  “Absent an allegation of fraud or conflict of interest, 
a court will not review the substance of corporate contracts; the waste theory 
represents a theoretical exception to the statement very rarely encountered in the 
world of real transactions . . . [R]arest of all --  and indeed, like Nessie, possibly 
non-existent – would be the case of disinterested businesspeople making non-
fraudulent deals (non negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste!” Steiner v. 
Meyerson, Civil Action No. 13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *13-*14 (Del.Ch. 
July 18, 1995). 
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Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.25 In Disney, the court was called upon to 
rule on whether Disney directors had breached their fiduciary duty when, 
among other things, they approved an employment contract for Michael 
Ovitz which entitled Ovitz to a $130 million severance package after a 
mere fourteen months as President of Disney.26 The court indicated that, 
prior to Ovitz’s termination, “the Disney board had never met to vote on, 
or even discussed, the termination in full session . . . The Disney directors 
had been taken on a wild ride, and most of it was in the dark.”  In 
describing the boardroom culture at Disney, the court wrote of “how 
ornamental, passive directors contribute to sycophantic tendencies among 
directors and how imperial CEOs can exploit this condition for their own 
benefit, especially in the compensation and severance area.”27 It described 
CEO Michael Eisner’s relationship with other board members as follows: 
By virtue of [Eisner’s] Machiavellian (and imperial) 
nature as CEO, and his control over Ovitz’s hiring in 
particular, Eisner is to a large extent responsible for the 
failings in process that infected and handicapped the 
board’s decisionmaking abilities.  Eisner stacked his (and I 
intentionally write “his” as opposed to “the Company’s”) 
board of directors with friends and acquaintances who. . . 
were certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and 
support him unconditionally than truly independent 
directors.28 
25 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 09, 2005). 
26 Id. at *25. 
27 Id. at *28 n.373. 
28 Id. at *40. 
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Nonetheless, despite board conduct that contained “many lessons on what 
not to do,”29 the Court of Chancery held, in a decision affirmed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court,30 that the Disney directors had not violated their 
fiduciary duties. 
 If litigation provides no real constraint on excessive compensation, 
what about shareholder voting?  Bebchuk and Fried argue that it too is 
inadequate in the face of managerial power.31 It is true that in certain 
instances, such as the adoption of a stock option plan, the major 
exchanges’ listing rules require that a corporation submit the plan to a 
shareholder vote.32 However, the vote does not effectively constrain CEO 
compensation, since it concerns only general matters, such as the total 
options that may be issued under the plan, rather than the compensation of 
any particular executive.33 It is also true that Section 162(m) of the 
 
29 Id. at *39 (emphasis supplied). 
30 -- A.2d---, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006). 
31 PWP, supra note 4, at 48-51. 
32 See, e.g., NASD Rule 4350; NYSE Listed Company Manual 303A.08, 
http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.google.co
m/search%3Fsourceid%3Dnavclient%26ie%3DUTF-
8%26rls%3DGGLD%2CGGLD%3A2003-
37%2CGGLD%3Aen%26q%3DNYSE+Listed+Company+Manual&displayPage=/
listed/1022221393251.html (last modified Feb. 11, 2004).  
33 PWP, supra note 4, at 49.  See also Developments in the Law, Slimming the Fat 
Cats? Evaluating the New Stock Exchange Listing Standards Requiring 
Shareholder Approval of Stock Option Plans, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2205, 2214 
(2004). 
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Internal Revenue Code disallows deductions for compensation exceeding 
$1 million per executive unless it is “performance based,” and one of the 
requirements for “performance based” compensation is that the material 
terms of the excess amount over $1 million be been approved by a majority 
of the shareholders in a separate vote.34 However, assuming shareholders 
are knowledgeable enough to vote intelligently on compensation issues,35
they are not presented with any alternative to the plan approved and 
proposed by the board.  Therefore, if the shareholders were to reject the 
board’s plan before an alternative became available, senior management 
could resign and throw the company into crisis.  To prevent this, a board 
might simply pay executives the cash equivalent of the rejected plan, since 
the exchange rules do not require a shareholder vote on cash 
compensation.  But the result could make shareholders even worse off, 
since cash payments would not necessarily be linked to performance of the 
stock price.  And if shareholders did not approve the compensation, it 
 
34 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000). 
35 In fact, this is not always a valid assumption, given the complexity of the 
documents and the frequent need to tailor the details of the compensation plan to 
the specifics of the particular industry.  See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. 
Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1033-34 (1999). 
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would not be deemed “performance based,” and amounts over $1 million 
would not be tax deductible.36
Finally, argue Bebchuk and Fried, neither the labor market, the market 
for corporate control, the capital market, nor the product market constrains 
executive pay.  Thus, the only remaining restraint on inappropriate 
compensation are “outrage costs,” which Bebchuk and Fried define as 
outsiders’ negative reactions to unjustified, abusive, or egregious pay 
practices.37 But even outrage costs can be rendered ineffective, since 
companies endeavour to camouflage the extent and form of their 
compensation.   
Because perceptions are so important, the designers of 
compensation plans can limit outside criticism and outrage 
by dressing, packaging, or hiding – in short camouflaging 
– rent extraction. . . . [M]anagers will prefer compensation 
practices that obscure the total amount of compensation, 
that appear to be more performance based than they 
actually are, and that package pay in ways that make it 
easier to justify and defend.38 
Indeed, the very fact that CEOs feel the need to camouflage their pay (as is 
not the case with movie stars, athletes, and other highly paid stars) strongly 
 
36 PWP, supra note 4, at 49-50. 
37 Id. at 65. 
38 Id. at 67. 
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suggests to Bebchuk and Fried that most compensation packages are not 
arrived at by arms length negotiation.39
Examples of camouflage cited by Bebchuk and Fried include long-time 
managerial resistance to the expensing of options,40 the widespread use of 
tax-inefficient supplemental executive retirement plans or “SERPs,” which 
do not enable the company to reap tax  benefits but may allow CEOs to 
reap camouflage benefits,41 deferred compensation arrangements, which 
permit the CEO to enjoy an undisclosed, above-market rate of return prior 
to vesting,42 and post-retirement perks and consulting compensation, which 
need not be disclosed because the recipient is no longer CEO at the time he 
receives the benefits.43 Bebchuk and Robert Jackson conducted a study of 
the pension plans among the CEOs of the Fortune 500 who either retired 
during 2003 or the first five months of 2004, or were at or close to 
retirement age in 2004.  Although the companies were not required to 
disclose the total costs of such plans to shareholders,44 they were required 
to disclose the existence of the plans and the method for determining the 
 
39 Id. at 21.  
40 Id. at 150. 
41 Id. at 97-100. 
42 Id. at 105. 
43 Id. at 110. 
44 New rules approved in July 2006 will require companies to include a pension 
benefits table disclosing the actuarial present value of each of the accumulated 
benefits under each pension plan of the CEO and other designated executives. 
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annual benefit.45 Only by examining each company’s proxy materials, 8-k 
filings, and CEO employment contract, as well as by estimating the likely 
payout by taking into account factors such as each CEO’s tenure at the 
company, age, and expected life span, were the authors able to estimate the 
costs of such plans to shareholders.  They found that, for recently retired 
CEOs, the average cost exceeded $21 million, and for incumbent CEOs 
between the age of 63 and 67, the average cost exceeded $26 million.46 
According to Bebchuk and Fried, unrestrained managerial power, 
coupled with camouflage, leads to “pay without performance,” in which 
CEOs enjoy extraordinarily high pay irrespective of whether they increase 
shareholder value.  For example, CEOs of companies in the S&P 500 
averaged $2 million in cash salary and bonus in 2002, but the variation in 
cash pay among the CEOs was not correlated to performance relative to 
their respective industries.47 Although option grants were meant to 
overcome the alignment problems found in cash compensation, Bebchuk 
and Fried point out that standard, non-indexed, at-the-money option 
grants48 often provide CEOs with windfall benefits.  After all, the rise in a 
 
45 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 823, 828 (2005). 
46 Id. at 837-38. 
47 PWP, supra note 4, at 122-23. 
48 In a standard, non-indexed at-the-money grant, the CEO receives the option at 
any time during a designated period (typically ten years) to purchase shares of the 
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given company’s stock may simply be part of a general rise in the market, 
resulting from the mere passage of time, or from circumstances beyond the 
CEO’s control, such as a reduction in interest rates.49 Although boards 
could solve much of the windfall problem by “indexing” options so that the 
exercise price would rise or fall in tandem with a given index, such as the 
S&P 500, indexed options are rare, a fact that Bebchuk and Fried view as 
further support for the managerial power thesis.50 And while boards do not 
 
company at the market price (known as the “exercise” or “strike” price) prevailing 
as of the date of the grant.  Thus, for example, if the CEO received 100 options at 
an exercise price of $20 and five years later, he or she exercised the option when 
the market price for the stock was $40, the CEO would reap a benefit of ($40-$20) 
x 100, or $2000.  An “in-the-money” option would set the exercise price below the 
market price on the date of the grant, while an “out-of-the-money” option would set 
the exercise price above the market price on the grant date.  If the option were 
indexed, then the exercise price would rise or fall in tandem with a specific index, 
such as the S&P 500.  In the foregoing example, assuming that the option was 
indexed to the S&P, and the S&P increased 50% over the five-year period, the 
exercise price would also rise 50% to $30.  The CEO’s gain on exercise would be 
reduced to ($40-$30) x 100, or $1000. 
49 PWP, supra note 4, at 138-39.  Warren Buffett has pointed out another method 
by which CEOs can ensure that, over time, the value of un-indexed stock options 
will increase – consistently withholding dividends and buying back company stock.  
Buffett imagines a Company called Stagnant Corporation, which has granted a ten 
year, at-the-money option to its CEO, Fred Futile, to purchase 1% of the company.  
During the ten year period Stagnant Corporation enjoys no growth, each year 
earning $1 billion on $10 billion net assets, equal to $10 per share on each of its 
outstanding 100 million shares.  If, rather than paying any dividends, Fred uses the 
$1 billion to repurchase shares, and the shares continue to sell at 10 times earnings, 
the shares will have appreciated 158% over the ten years.  “That’s because 
repurchases would reduce the number of shares to 38.7 million by that time and 
earnings per share would therefore increase to $28.50.  Simply by withholding 
earnings from owners, Fred gets very rich, making a cool $158 million, despite the 
business itself improving not at all.”  Buffett, supra note 16, at 16. 
50 PWP, supra note 4, at 141-43.  There may be good reasons, however, not to 
index option grants.  For one thing, suppose Company A’s board indexed CEO 
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index options upward, they do often re-price them downward when the 
shares drop deeply out of the money, essentially providing CEOs with a 
gift, despite the poor performance of the company’s shares.51 An even 
more egregious practice, which has come to light since the publication of 
Bebchuk and Fried’s book, has been the widespread use, particularly 
among high technology companies, of backdated options.  Options actually 
granted on a given date are made effective retroactively, as of a date when 
the stock price was lower.  This decreases the exercise price of the option 
and enables executives to reap a larger benefit from the option grant.  
Despite the claim that stock option grants incentivize executives to 
increase the company’s stock price in the future, backdating rewards 
 
options to the movement of the S&P 500.  If the S&P dropped 10 % while 
Company A shares stayed flat, shareholders might complain that Company A’s 
CEO is being unfairly rewarded for the fall in the price of other shares.  Or imagine 
the CEO of Big Oil, Inc.  As a result of rising oil prices, the S&P plummets as Big 
shares rise spectacularly. Big’s CEO would be doubly rewarded for events beyond 
his control.  In order to avoid the problem of sectors whose stocks move counter to 
a broad index, Big’s stock options could be tied to the “energy sector.”  But 
defining the sector could be difficult, and it could open the way to manipulation ex 
ante. Query: was Enron in energy or financial services?  If, in order to avoid 
definitional problems, Big indexed options to the stock of a few companies  in its 
peer group, the pay to Big’s CEO could vary wildly simply as a result of a large 
scandal at, or a large windfall to, a competitor.  Even a perfectly designed index 
could present new problems.  Saul Levmore has suggested that indexing options 
might encourage CEOs to take on excessively risky projects, since they will receive 
the same payout (zero) from their options whether they index returns or take a big 
risk that fails spectacularly, but will receive a huge payoff if their gamble succeeds. 
See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1901, 1922-23 (2001). 
51 PWP, supra note 4, at 165-67. 
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executives merely for short term volatility in the recent past.  SEC 
investigations into the practice have only just begun, but one academic 
study using statistical analysis of 7,774 companies’ stock option grants 
between 1996 and 2005 has found that an estimated 29.2%, or 2,270 
companies, at some point manipulated stock grants.52 Even in those 
companies that do not engage in backdating, Bebchuk and Fried point out 
that CEOs can often blunt the risks (and alignment of interests) associated 
with stock options by selling their shares promptly upon exercise of the 
underlying options or by hedging against the performance of the shares, 
thereby protecting themselves against future drop in the company’s stock 
price.53 
Bebchuk and Fried indicate that their primary goal is to call 
attention to the problem of executive compensation, rather than to propose 
solutions.  Nonetheless, they do suggest several specific reforms.  First, 
they advocate steps to enhance transparency, such as expensing options, 
placing a monetary value on all compensation, and disclosing what fraction 
of executives’ option gains resulted from performance that was superior to 
that of its industry peers.54 These suggestions are relatively 
 
52 Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern 
Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming). 
53 PWP, supra note 4, at 176-79.  
54 Id. at 192-94. 
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uncontroversial, and several have already been implemented.  For example, 
since fiscal year 2006, companies have been required to expense employee 
stock option grants,55 and the newly-approved disclosure rules, to be 
effective December 15, 2006 will require companies to disclose in tabular 
form the actuarial present value of the accumulated benefits under each 
pension plan of the CEO and other designated executives.56 Indeed, the 
new rules include an additional reform not mentioned by Bebchuk and 
Fried, the requirement that the company insert into the proxy statement a 
“compensation discussion and analysis” statement, written in plain English 
and signed by the CEO and Chief Financial Officer.57 
But disclosure alone will not solve what is arguably the most 
significant problem in the pay-setting process – the board’s lack of 
accountability to the shareholders.  Therefore, Bebchuk and Fried advocate 
strengthening the influence of shareholders in three ways.  First, they 
would require companies to obtain specific shareholders approval for 
certain “suspect” forms of compensation, such as non-indexed options, re-
 
55 See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 107, 70 Fed. Reg. 16693 (codified at 17 
C.F.R. Part 211, Subpart B). 
56 See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure,71 Fed. Reg. 6542, 
6611-12 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c), 17 
C.F.R. § 228.402(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.10). 
57 See id. at 6611 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)). 
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priced options, and large severance payments.58 Second, they would grant 
shareholders more say in the appointment and reappointment of directors.  
Currently, while shareholders have the right to elect directors, they 
generally may not nominate them.  Bebchuk and Fried would permit any 
shareholder who for one year has held, say, 5% of the shares to gain access 
to the corporate ballot for board elections.  Instead of the existing rule, 
which requires a shareholder to pay its own costs in any proxy fight,59 
Bebchuk and Fried would require the company to cover the costs of proxy 
campaigns that garner significant support.60 Third, Bebchuk and Fried 
would give shareholders the power to initiate changes to the corporate 
charter.61 
58 Id. at 195-98. 
59 Currently, Rule 14a-8, pursuant to which a shareholder can shift the costs of a 
proxy proposal by compelling a corporation to place it on the corporate proxy, is 
not available for disputes over the election of particular board members.  See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2005).  Rule 14a-8 is discussed further infra notes 106-113 
and accompanying text. 
60 PWP, supra note 4, at 210-11. 
61 Id. at 212-13.  Bebchuk and Fried also suggest companies should link CEO pay 
more closely to performance by indexing options, limiting executives’ ability to 
unwind holdings, and avoiding “soft landings” in which unsuccessful CEOs are 
given generous severance payments upon departure.  See id. at 190-91.  
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II. OBJECTIONS TO THE MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS 
The managerial power thesis has drawn considerable criticism among 
commentators.  Some have claimed that CEO pay in the U.S. is not in fact 
excessive.  They argue that high CEO compensation is justified by the size 
and complexity of large organizations.  One commentator has pointed out 
that asset managers, who would seem to have less complex duties than 
CEOs, typically receive a higher percentage of “assets under management” 
than CEOs do, even after accounting for the asset managers’ costs of doing 
business.  Surely, he argues, CEOs are entitled to pay on par with that of 
asset managers.62 As for international comparisons, one commentator has 
posited five possible explanations for the relatively high pay of U.S. 
CEOs.63 Perhaps, he argues, U.S. CEOs are paid more because they 
contribute more to their firms’ value than do foreign CEOs; or because the 
tournament to become a U.S. CEO is bigger, due to the greater power U.S. 
CEOs wield, compared to their foreign counterparts; or because U.S. 
 
62 Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on Pay without Performance, 30 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 777, 781-82 (2005). 
63 This international compensation differential may be shrinking.  See Geraldine 
Fabrikant, Gilded Paycheck: American Export.  U.S. Style Pay Deals for Chiefs 
Become All the Rage in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A1 (noting that the 
differential between  U.S. and European CEOs is declining as European CEOs 
demand pay in line with that of the U.S.). 
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executives are more mobile and can change companies in order to receive 
higher pay; or because of the presence of poison pills and the absence of 
control shareholders in U.S. companies, which has shifted bargaining 
power to management.64 
Others have argued that even if CEO pay is high, it can nonetheless be 
justified since, over time, U.S. shares have performed better than those of 
markets where CEOs are paid less.65 Certainly, rational shareholders 
would prefer to pay an extra $1 million to CEOs if that would lead to an 
additional shareholder return in excess of $1 million. 
Still others have pointed out that increased CEO pay is part of the 
larger labor market phenomenon known as the superstar effect.  As 
organizations get larger, even slightly better management can cause a 
dramatic increase in total shareholder value.66 This increased value may 
justify a proportional increase in pay for the CEO.  Other types of stars, 
such as pro baseball players, have been enjoying similar pay increases as 
the amount of money in professional baseball increases, although baseball 
 
64 Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International Pay Gap:  Board Capture or 
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1176-80 (2004). 
65 John Core, Wayne Guay, & Randall Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation 
Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1165-66 (2005); 
Ian T. Kay, CEO Pay for Performance: The Solution to “Managerial Power”, 30 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 785 (2005). 
66 R. Glenn Hubbard, Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique,
30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 717, 718 (2005). 
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players cannot manipulate the negotiation process.67 Not all the rise in 
CEO salaries can therefore be attributed to managerial power. 
Bebchuk and Fried have also been faulted for failing to distinguish 
between the legitimate bargaining power of talented people and the 
illegitimate manipulation of the negotiation process.68 One study of CEO 
compensation during the years 1992 to 2000 indicated that externally hired 
CEOs, who do not tend to have power over the existing board, made on 
average 96% more compensation than CEOs hired from within the 
corporation.69 This finding implies that the high salaries of outsiders at 
least result from their strong, but legitimate, bargaining power.70 
Other commentators concede that boards and CEOs do not engage in 
idealized arms length bargaining over CEO salaries, but deny that the arms 
 
67 Snyder, supra note 10, at 155-59. 
68 Id. at 152-55. 
69 Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power 
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 853-54 
(2002). 
70 Bebchuk and Fried attempt to address this point by arguing that the directors 
would still have a strong incentive to please the new externally-hired CEO, since he 
or she would have influence over the director’s re-election prospects.  The directors 
may also be disinclined to bargain with the CEO candidate over pay, since they 
“want to get things off to a pleasant start.” PWP, supra note 4, at 40.  Yet this 
hardly explains why the pay of externally hired CEOs would be higher than that of 
internal hires.  A better argument might begin by pointing out that managerial 
power distorts the market price for all CEOs.  Since an externally hired CEO is 
often either the CEO of another firm or an executive who has the possibility of one 
day becoming CEO, a firm wishing to hire externally would need to compensate 
the candidate for the forgone opportunities in his current role.  In that sense, 
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length negotiation model is the correct standard by which to judge the 
negotiations.71 They claim that the relationship between the CEO and the 
board (or company) would be best described as a long term relational 
contract.  In such contracts, parties tend not to fight for every advantage, 
but recognise that a given negotiation is only part of a broader relationship.   
The directors’ perception that they should support the 
CEO, their reluctance to override substantive decisions 
except under unusual circumstances, and their desire to be 
part of the “team” are not necessarily abdications of 
authority but may instead reflect the board’s view that the 
long term interest of the corporation is furthered by 
cooperation and team building.72 
As a senior consultant for TIAA-CREF and former board member 
succinctly put it, “[b]oards have to be tough. They have to be collegial at 
the same time, though.”73 Or, to use the words of a former SEC 
Commissioner, “[m]oney may be ‘left on the table.’  And, yet, the best 
interests of shareholders may have been served.”74 
externally-hired CEOs may be indirect beneficiaries of the widespread exercise of 
managerial power in the market for CEOs generally.   
71 See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 10, at 149-52; Longstreth, supra note 20, at 767-
68.  
72 Snyder, supra note 10, at 151.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Human 
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 810 (2001) (suggesting that 
collegiality is necessary to enable mutual commitment and to make consensus-
reaching practical). 
73 Kenneth West, Pay without Performance: An Executive’s Perspective, 30 IOWA 
J. CORP. L. 791, 792 (2005). 
74 Longstreth, supra note 20, at 768. 
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Turning to the specific pay practices criticized by Bebchuk and Fried, 
such as non-indexed at-the-money options, Kevin Murphy claims that there 
is a better explanation than managerial power for their widespread 
adoption.  Boards may simply have considered such options a “cheap” 
form of compensation, since they require no immediate cash outlay and, 
until recently, they did not need to be treated as an expense for accounting 
purposes.75 On the other hand, risk averse and undiversified managers 
discount the value of high risk options, and demand large option grants in 
lieu of cash.76 In short, boards’ and managers’ respective assessments of 
the cost and value of such options may explain their increased use better 
than does managerial power alone.  As evidence of this, one study found 
that nearly 80% of the options granted in S&P 500 Industrials, S&P 500 
Financials, and New Economy firms in 2000 were granted to executives 
and employees below the top five, presumably employees without 
significant power over the board.77 
III.  REACTIONS TO BEBCHUK AND FRIED’S PROPOSED REFORMS  
75 Murphy, supra note 69, at 859-60. 
76 Id. at 859. 
77 Id. at 857. 
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Given the controversy surrounding Bebchuk and Fried’s diagnosis 
of the problem of CEO pay, one could expect similar reaction to their 
proposed solutions.  And in fact, while commentators have not objected to 
their proposals to increase transparency, they have raised numerous 
objections to proposals to allow shareholders to appoint nominees to the 
board and to initiate changes to the corporate charter.  For the most part, 
critics have expressed concern that, once empowered, shareholders would 
either fail to use their new power, or if the shareholders did use it, would 
do so to the detriment of the corporation.   
Critics have pointed out that institutional shareholders are often 
unwilling to become engaged in the internal matters of corporations in 
which they invest, since their costs in time and liquidity would likely 
exceed the expected benefits.78 Rational institutional investors would 
rather sell the shares of companies that destroy shareholder value (either 
through inappropriate payment practices or otherwise) than hold on to 
under-performing shares long enough to effect the necessary 
improvements.79 
78 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Empowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751-52 (2006). 
79 Id. See also Olin Kramer, Pay without Performance: The Institutional 
Perspective, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 773, 774-75 (2005); Thomas & Martin, supra 
note 35, at 1034; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 629-33 (2006). 
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Moreover, they note, one cannot assume that those shareholders 
who are willing to become engaged in corporate governance issues will 
necessarily promote the financial interests of all of the shareholders.  
Delaware Vice Chancellor Strine makes the point as follows:  “Those 
institutions most inclined to be activist investors are associated with state 
governments and labor unions, and often appear to be driven by concerns 
other than a desire to increase the economic performance of the companies 
in which they invest.”80 For example, a large union pension fund might 
threaten to mount a proxy fight for the election of board members who 
would accede to the union’s wage demands.  Indeed, some have argued 
that such a scenario was at the heart of the decision by CalPERS (a former 
president of which was the regional director of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers) to withhold support for the election of the Safeway 
CEO, following a strike at Safeway.81 
It has also been pointed out that, even assuming shareholders do 
not pursue non-economic agendas, differing types of shareholders could 
have widely divergent interests.  For example, a hedge fund with a short 
term investment horizon might clamour for policies that sacrifice long term 
 
80 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1759, 1765 (2006); see also Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 1754-55. 
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interests for short term gain.  Similarly, diversified shareholders (who have 
eliminated firm-specific risk) might advocate the implementation of 
projects that would be too risky to suit the preferences of undiversified 
shareholders.82 How do companies generally attempt to reconcile these 
divergent interests?  By placing the authority to make decisions on behalf 
of the corporation into the hands of the board of directors.  Courts facilitate 
this centralization of authority when they apply the business judgment 
rule83 to insulate most board decisions from shareholder challenge.84 
Granting shareholders greater power might enhance board’s accountability, 
but only at a cost to board authority.85 To exacerbate matters, Bebchuk 
 
81 Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 590 (2006). 
82 Id. at 577-92. 
83 The business judgment rule has been characterized by the Delaware Supreme 
Court as “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Smith v. Van Gorkam, 
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).  Absent a showing of fraud, overreaching, lack of 
good faith, or being uninformed, a court will defer to the business judgment of the 
directors, and will not substitute its judgment for that of the board.  See Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).  
84 See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. L.J. 
461 (1992).  “The business judgment rule can only be understood as intended to 
protect the authority of the board and thus to promote the value of Authority. . . . 
[T]he power to hold a party accountable is the power to interfere and, ultimately, 
the power to decide. Thus, affording shareholders the right to demand frequent 
judicial review of board decisions has the effect of transferring decision-making 
authority from the board to the shareholders.”  Id. at 470. 
85 Stephen Bainbridge describes the dichotomy between authority and 
accountability has as follows: “A compete theory of corporate governance . . . 
requires balancing the virtues of discretionary fiat against the need to ensure that 
such power is used to further the interests of shareholders.  Because the power to 
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and Fried’s proposal could end up making directors more accountable, not 
to shareholders generally, but simply to those shareholders that attempted 
to assert their new-found power; and, as demonstrated above, there is no 
guarantee that the assertive shareholders’ interests are always aligned with 
those of other shareholders.86 
In short, commentators have pointed out that Bebchuik and Fried’s 
proposed reforms could entail great costs.  Thus, they should only be 
undertaken if they would bring shareholders even greater benefits.  
Turning to the putative benefits, critics have argued that they 
would be rather small in comparison to the costs described above.  After 
all, they argue, there is evidence that, despite the absolute size of CEO pay, 
 
hold to account differs only in degree and not in kind from the power to decide, fiat 
and accountability also are antithetical.”  Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 1747.  Or, 
as he states elsewhere in the same paper: “There are limits on one’s ability to 
reduce agency costs without undermining the centralization of fiat that makes the 
modern corporation work.”  Id. at 1741. 
86 Commentators have pointed out a number of other unintended consequences that 
might arise if shareholders had the power to nominate board members.  For 
example, perfectly independent board members who significantly improve 
compensation practices might nonetheless be unqualified to fulfil other more 
important tasks, such as selecting good projects and making good investment 
decisions. The net result could be negative for shareholders.  See Core et al., supra 
note 65, at 1162-63.  A similarly negative result could occur if a board comprised 
of capable people, under excessive pressure from the company’s shareholders, felt 
compelled to adopt an overly adversarial attitude towards the CEO.  In response, 
the CEO could simply withhold information from the board members, thereby 
rendering the board less effective.  See Bengt Holmstrom, Pay without 
Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis:  A Comment, 30 J. CORP. L. 
703, 711-12 (2005). 
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the amounts involved may not be material to shareholders.87 If 
shareholders really felt that CEO pay was a material concern, one would 
expect that they would often reject option plans submitted for shareholder 
approval.  In fact, a study of shareholder voting on stock option plans 
during the 1998 proxy season found less than 1% failed to receive the 
approval of shareholders.88 One former SEC commissioner put the 
materiality point forcefully as follows:   
The Chartered Financial Analysis Institute, representing 
more than 70,000 money managers, investment advisers, 
and Chartered Financial Analysts (CFAs), teaches CFAs 
how to study a corporation and how to determine what 
matters and what does not matter in assessing the buy, sell, 
or hold decision. It even teaches CFAs about the voting 
decisions and how, with professional confidence, to reach 
conclusions on which many will rely. The CFA represents 
the best of the breed. When and if they start to attribute 
telling importance to executive compensation 
arrangements in deciding what to recommend, this matter 
will become important to investors . . .  Until this time 
comes, the issue, by definition, lacks materiality.89 
87 See Loewenstein, supra note 9, at 11 (referencing a study that indicated that, had 
the CEOs of the 1000 largest US corporations worked without compensation in 
1992, shareholder returns would have increased by only 0.06%). 
88 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder 
Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 58 (2000).  
89 Longstreth, supra note 20, at 770-71.  But another explanation for CFAs’ 
apparent apathy is that, to the extent that the excessive compensation is endemic to 
publicly traded US corporations, CEO pay is not material for determining relative 
returns.  If, however, CEO pay were to decline or to become better aligned with 
actual performance, material benefits would accrue, especially to the diversified 
investor.  See infra p. 46. 
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IV. COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES: A PRUDENT APPROACH 
The controversy can now be summarized as follows:  Bebchuk and 
Fried have pointed out numerous defects in the process for determining 
CEO pay, and have demonstrated how the process falls short of the ideal of 
the arms length negotiation.   They have argued that the defects have led to 
excessive CEO pay, largely de-linked from CEO performance.  To address 
the problem, they have suggested, among other things, making boards more 
responsive to shareholders, by empowering shareholders (i) to specifically 
approve certain “suspect” forms of compensation, (ii) to nominate 
directors, and (iii) to initiate changes to the corporate charter.90 Critics 
have responded by arguing that CEO pay may not, in fact, be excessive, 
and that CEOs may simply be using their legitimate bargaining power to 
command high pay.  They have justified mega option grants by noting that 
options are viewed by the corporation as inexpensive and by CEOs as 
risky.  As for Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal to increase shareholder power, 
they have argued, in effect, that the proposed cure is worse than the 
 
90 For other proposed reforms, see, e.g.,  Charles M. Elson, Director 
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board – The History of  a Symptom 
and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (proposing that all directors be paid only in 
stock of the relevant corporation); Lowenstein, supra note 10 (proposing that 
shareholders be allowed an advisory up or down vote on CEO pay); Holmstrom, 
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disease, especially since the amounts involved may not be material to 
investors.   
The arguments of both sides to this debate appear to have merit, 
but can they be reconciled?  To a certain degree, the answer is yes.  On the 
one hand, the recent increases in the compensation of highly talented 
persons generally do imply that not all of the rise in CEO compensation is 
attributable to managerial power.  Critics of Bebchuk and Fried also have a 
point when they argue that, as Vice Chancellor Strine put it, “the current 
American approach to corporate governance appears, on balance, to 
produce good results.”91 They are therefore right to be skeptical about 
radical changes to the balance of power between boards and shareholders, 
particularly while there is some question regarding the financial materiality 
of CEO pay to shareholders, the putative beneficiaries of reform.  On the 
other hand, it is important to note that none of the critics have defended the 
existing pay-setting process, except by claiming that arms length 
negotiations by a divided and adversarial board could be even worse.  One 
prominent critic implicitly admitted that the process is seriously flawed 
when he made the following concession: 
 
supra note 86 (proposing the institution of generally accepted compensation 
practices, analogous to GAAP, which can be audited). 
91 Strine, supra note 80, at 1769. 
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Judgment calls tend systematically to favour the CEO.  
Faced with a range of market data on competitive pay 
levels, committees tend to err on the high side.  Faced with 
a choice between a sensible compensation plan and a 
slightly inferior one favoured by the CEO, the committee 
will defer to management. . . . The amounts at stake in any 
particular case are typically trivial from a shareholder’s 
perspective, but the overall impact of the bias has likely 
contributed to the ratcheting of pay levels [described in 
this article].92
What then should be done?  In view of the uncertainty regarding 
the extent of excessive pay, as well as the risks associated with adopting 
radical changes to corporate governance, reformers should strive to adopt a 
prudent approach that addresses the process problems without 
simultaneously creating new problems.  Prudent reform would have the 
following characteristics.  First, it would insert into the compensation 
setting process parties who are immune to CEO pressure and responsive to 
shareholder concerns.  Second, it would address compensation process 
flaws in a targeted way, with minimal spill-over into other areas of 
corporate governance.  In other words, it would not fundamentally alter the 
existing balance between directors and shareholders, or jeopardise the 
collegiality of many well functioning boards.  Third, it would provide a 
substantial enough improvement over the existing system to justify its 
 
92 KEVIN J. MURPHY, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 2485, 2518 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999). 
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adoption.  It would further the interests of shareholders, while being 
mindful of the limits and possible disadvantages, discussed above, of direct 
shareholder involvement.  It would avoid imposing on shareholders 
demands that exceed their expertise or costs that exceed expected benefits, 
and it would involve shareholders only to the extent likely to promote the 
long-term interests of the corporation.  Fourth, prudent reform would be 
achievable with minimal changes to existing law, particularly since one 
could expect that significant legal changes that might be viewed as 
impinging on power of directors or threatening the pay of COEs would be 
strongly resisted by powerful members of the business lobbying 
community.93 Finally, prudent reform would be flexible.  Rather than 
requiring significant changes to all firms, irrespective of individual 
 
93 A case in point is provided by the modest reforms that the SEC proposed in 
2003 in order to enhance shareholder nomination rights in limited circumstances.   
See 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003).  The negative reaction by the Business 
Roundtable and other lobbying organizations was decisive.   According to the SEC 
staff, "The vast majority of commenters supported modifying the proxy rules and 
regulations related to the nomination and election of directors.  Commenters who 
did not support such a modification included all of the corporations and corporate 
executives, most of the legal community, and the majority of associations (mostly 
business associations)." Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the 
Nomination and Election of Directors, Division of Corporate Finance (July 15, 
2003) http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyrpt.htm#P67_12802.  The reforms 
were ultimately not adopted. 
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circumstances, it would allow arrangements to be tried in the marketplace 
and vindicated or discredited by the market itself.94
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles for prudent reform, this 
paper proposes that companies create a special non-executive position, 
tentatively entitled “compensation representative,” to represent the 
interests of shareholders with respect to CEO compensation.  The three 
largest eligible shareholders of the corporation, acting by consensus, would 
have the right to appoint the compensation representative.   If they are 
unable to agree on a candidate, they may submit the decision to a neutral 
arbitrator of their choosing.  In order to be eligible to participate in the 
appointment of the compensation representative, a large shareholder must 
(i) have held its shares for at least one year, and (ii) not have material 
business dealings with the company, other than in its capacity as a 
shareholder.   
Compensation representatives would not have the right to vote 
either as members of the compensation committee or the board of 
directors.  They would not be authorised to manage the business or affairs 
 
94 Prudent reform would not set a ceiling on CEO pay, whether in absolute terms 
or as a multiple of worker salaries.  If, as some commentators claim, high CEO pay 
results from the limited supply of exceptional CEOs and their legitimate use of the 
resulting bargaining power, a corporation should not be restricted from awarding 
appropriately high compensation.   
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of the corporation.  Their rights and duties would instead be limited to the 
following: (i) to attend all compensation committee meetings (formal or 
informal), as well as all board of director meetings, to the extent such 
board meetings concern CEO compensation matters; (ii) to inspect all 
documents relating to CEO compensation; (iii) to demand compensation- 
related information from compensation committee members, compensation 
consultants, and other board members; (iv) to advise and give opinions on 
CEO compensation matters, including its form, amount, conditions for 
receipt, and timing; (v) to submit to compensation committees any 
objections to proposed compensation plans, and, in the event that the full 
board participates in the determination of CEO compensation, to submit 
objections to the full board; and (vi) finally, if unsatisfied with the 
response of compensation committees or boards, as the case may be, to 
submit objections to the shareholders that appointed them.  Following 
receipt of a compensation representative’s objections, an appointing 
shareholder could take any action thereon which it saw fit.  For example, 
one or more of the appointing shareholders could meet with members of 
the compensation committee to learn more about the reasons for the 
proposed compensation package and to discuss ways in which it might be 
improved.  In extreme cases, as discussed below, an objecting shareholder 
could force the corporation to include in its proxy a proposal to reject any 
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portions of the compensation package submitted for shareholder approval.  
It could also force the corporation to include in the proxy pay-related 
precatory proposals, in which the shareholders formally recommend that 
the board take certain actions without purporting to require that the board 
to do so.95 
There are numerous advantages to the compensation representative 
system over either the current system or the reforms proposed by Bebchuk 
and Fried.  First and foremost, the use of a compensation representative 
would address the most serious process problem raised by Bebchuk and 
Fried, the current failure of boards adequately to represent the interests of 
shareholders.  It would insert into the compensation process a party who is 
beholden not to the CEO, but to the shareholders.  Since the compensation 
representative would not be nominated or appointed by the board or CEO, 
he or she would be less susceptible to managerial power than are directors 
under the current system.  Moreover, the large shareholders which 
appointed the compensation representative would have a sufficient stake in 
the corporation to ensure that the representative would be accountable to 
the shareholders, and representatives who wish to be repeat players would 
have a strong incentive to develop a reputation for protecting shareholder 
interests.   
 
95 See infra notes 106-122 and accompanying text. 
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The compensation representative proposal is preferable to 
Bebchuk and Fried’s proposals, since it is a targeted response to the 
specific problem of CEO compensation.  Its effects would not spill over 
into other matters, since the role of a compensation representative would 
be limited to investigating and advising on compensation matters, and 
would not extend to the management of the corporation’s affairs.  This 
limited role ensures that the use of a compensation representative would 
not substantially alter the traditional balance of power between a 
corporation’s board and its shareholders. 96 It also would enable a 
compensation representative, who would not be a board member, to be 
tough with the CEO without sacrificing board collegiality.  The 
representative could serve as the “bad guy,” making it easier for the board 
to take a harder line with the CEO.  Rather than telling the CEO, “Bob, we 
don’t think you’re worth that much,” a board with a compensation 
representative could say, “Bob, we’d love to grant you the additional 
100,000 options -- and we really think you deserve it -- but if we do, that 
 
96 Presumably, Bebchuk for one would not view this limited role as a virtue, since 
he feels that granting shareholders greater rights would benefit corporate 
governance more generally.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 883 (2006) (arguing that shareholder 
value would be increased if shareholders were allowed to initiate changes in the 
corporate charter, to nominate board members, to change the company’s state of 
incorporation, and to initiate mergers and similar transactions).  
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S.O.B. is going to make a big stink about it, and the publicity would be bad 
for all of us.” 
One might argue that a compensation representative provides no 
improvement on the current system. After all, shareholders are already 
entitled to vote on significant portions of most compensation packages 
anyway.  But a system that merely allows shareholders the right to reject 
an inappropriate proposal is clearly inferior to one that could prevent the 
board from submitting the inappropriate proposal in the first place.  A 
compensation representative could become engaged in the details of the 
compensation package early in the process.  He or she would be in a 
position to detect manipulation, excess, or potential CEO windfalls from 
the outset, before the compensation committee or the board presents its 
recommendation to the shareholders.  Take an example in which a huge 
bonus is conditioned upon the CEO’s achievement of certain objective 
goals.  A diligent compensation representative would be better able than 
shareholders to judge whether the goals could be achieved easily or only 
through extraordinary CEO performance.  He or she could encourage the 
compensation committee to adopt demanding goals and could otherwise 
influence the details of the package to ensure the alignment of pay with 
performance, all prior to the shareholder vote. And certainly a 
compensation representative would be better able than shareholders to 
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detect and object to egregious practices such as the backdating of option 
grants. 
What is more, compensation representatives would likely become 
repeat players, working with more companies than even the most active 
and sought after board member.  Over time, they could develop expertise, 
market knowledge, and insight into the proper design of compensation 
packages, as well as into the way such packages can be manipulated.  
Thus, compensation representatives could not only benefit the 
shareholders, but they could also educate the compensation committee and 
board of directors on compensation best practices, thereby alleviating 
another problem identified by Bebchuk and Fried, the limits on the time 
and information available to independent directors.97 
The early involvement of a compensation representative would 
also benefit shareholders in those (hopefully rare) instances where the 
inclusion of a shareholder proxy proposal became necessary.  Currently, as 
mentioned above, when shareholders vote on a compensation scheme, they 
are not generally provided with an alternative to the board’s proposal, and 
may therefore feel compelled to approve inappropriate arrangements.98 If, 
however, a shareholder were to respond to the compensation 
 
97 PWP, supra note 4, at 36-37. 
98 See supra notes 35 and accompanying text. 
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representative’s objections by including a proxy proposal under Rule 14a-8 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder would have five 
hundred words in which to state, not only its objection to the board’s 
proposal, but the material terms of the recommended alternative pay 
arrangement, thereby providing a real alternative to the board’s proposal.99 
And regardless of whether the general shareholders ultimately accepted the 
shareholder proposal, its very inclusion in the proxy could encourage 
directors to be more transparent regarding executive pay, since they would 
need to clearly justify their proposed arrangements in response to the 
specific objections set forth in the shareholder proposal.  
What about the potential dissention and conflict among 
participating shareholders?  Since neither the compensation representative 
nor the appointing shareholders would be engaged in the management of 
the corporation, the likelihood of significant conflict among shareholders 
would be small.  And all shareholders would benefit proportionally if a 
compensation representative either lowered CEO pay, enhanced CEO 
performance, or both.100 But if a conflict were to arise between long and 
short term shareholders, the proposal set forth in this paper specifically 
favors long term shareholders, since only shareholders who have held their 
 
99 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(c) and (d) (2005).  For details regarding the use of Rule 
14a-8, see infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text. 
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shares for at least one year could participate in the appointment of the 
compensation representative.  Likewise, conflicts between insiders and 
outsiders would be resolved in favour of outsiders, since shareholders with 
material business dealings with the corporation could not participate in the 
appointment of the compensation representative.101 
What if a shareholder wished to use the compensation 
representative to sabotage the corporation for private gain?  Imagine, for 
example, that Company S, the largest shareholder of Company A, owns 1% 
of Company A, as well as 20% of Company B, a competitor of A.   What if 
Company S tried to appoint an unduly aggressive and confrontational 
compensation representative in order to force the CEO of A to resign, to 
the detriment of Company S’s investment in Company A, but to the much 
larger benefit of its investment in Company B?  Or imagine scenario two, 
in which Company S tried to use the compensation representative to force 
Company A to acquire Company B at an excessive price, enabling 
Company S to capture a large premium on its investment in Company B 
sufficient to offset the loss on its smaller investment in Company A?  
 
100 Anabtawi, supra note 81, at 593. 
101 See David Parthiban, Rahul Kochar & Edward Levitas, The Effect of 
Institutional Investors on the Level and Mix of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 200 (1998) (an empirical study indicating that institutional investors that 
have merely an investment relationship with the firm influence compensation in 
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Finally, imagine scenario three in which Company S, a large financial 
institution, manages Company A’s very profitable pension program.  What 
if Company S hesitated to appoint a hardnosed compensation 
representative, for fear of jeopardizing its relationship with the CEO of 
Company A? 
The proposal set forth in this paper contains significant hurdles to 
all three scenarios.  As to the first, even if a shareholder wanted to use the 
compensation representative to force the resignation of a valuable CEO, it 
could not likely convince the other two appointing shareholders to appoint 
such a representative. And if a bad faith compensation representative did 
threaten to contest the board’s compensation proposal unless his or her 
demands were met, the threats would ring hollow, since unreasonable 
proxy proposals would likely be rejected by the full shareholder vote.102 
A shareholder’s attempt to effect scenario two would be subject to the 
same difficulties as scenario one.  But in addition, the shareholder in 
scenario two would be stymied by the fact that a compensation 
representative cannot engage in the management of the corporation, 
 
accordance with shareholder preferences, but that institutional shareholders that 
depend on the firm for their own business have no such influence).  
102 Rule 14a-8 would allow Company S to include the same compensation-related 
proxy proposals whether or not the company has a compensation representative. 
The participation of a bad faith compensation representative would add little to the 
threat posed to the CEO from such a proposal. 
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making it difficult to for the representative to pressure the corporation to 
take specific actions, such as a merger.  Finally, at for scenario three, the 
use of a lap-dog compensation representative would be no worse than the 
current system, in which the board makes its decision without the input of 
any shareholder representative.  But in any event, the precise scenario 
described could not occur, since shareholders with significant commercial 
dealings with the corporation would be excluded from the appointment 
process.  
Assuming that the proposal set forth in this paper would, if 
implemented, benefit shareholders, is it feasible under existing law?  Very 
much so.  In fact, as described below, it could be implemented in Delaware 
without the active involvement of courts, legislatures, or, perhaps most 
importantly, company boards.103 Under existing Delaware corporate law, a 
company’s by-laws would simply need to be amended to grant the three 
eligible shareholders the right to appoint a compensation representative 
having the rights and duties described above.   
In Delaware, the by-law amendment could be effected by either the 
board of directors or the shareholders.  Under Section 109(a) of the 
 
103 In this sense, the proposal set forth in this paper differs from Bebchuk and 
Fried’s proposal to force companies to pay the costs for board proxy contests that 
receive sufficient support.  Under current law, all such costs must be borne by the 
contesting shareholders.  
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Delaware General Corporation Law, the power to adopt, amend or repeal 
the by-laws is held by the shareholders, provided that the certificate of 
incorporation may confer such power on the board. 104 But “[t]he fact that 
such power has been conferred upon the directors or governing body, as 
the case may be, shall not divest the stockholders or members of? the 
power, nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal by-laws.” 105 Under 
the reasonable assumption that most boards would not unilaterally propose 
such a by-law amendment, shareholders may, under SEC Rule 14a-8 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, compel the corporation to include it in 
its proxy.106 
Rule 14a-8(i) provides, however, that a company may exclude a 
proposal from its proxy “if the proposal is not a proper subject for action 
by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s 
organization.”107 Recently, Professor Bebchuk has attempted to use Rule 
14a-8 to propose that CA, Inc. amend its by-laws to (i) allow shareholders 
to nominate directors, and (ii) limit the board’s ability to issue poison pills.  
Such proposals, however, are subject to the objection that they conflict 
with Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which 
 
104 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §109(a). 
105 Id. 
106 See SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).   
107 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8(i).  
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provides: “The business and affairs of every corporation organized under 
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation.”108 Indeed, the conflict with Section 141(a) 
was the stated reason that the board of CA, Inc. refused to include the 
proposal in its proxy.   Neither the SEC nor the Delaware courts have 
expressed an opinion on the merits of the board’s refusal, the former 
refusing to grant no-action letter pending the resolution of the matter under 
Delaware law,109 and the latter refusing to decide the matter on ripeness 
grounds.110 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, when interpreting 
provisions of its corporate code which are substantially identical to those 
of Delaware, held in a similar case that the shareholders may propose a by-
law to require shareholder approval for the issuance of poison pills.111 
In any event, an adverse ruling on Bebchuk’s CA proposal would 
not seem to cast doubt on the legality under Delaware law of a 
 
108 For a discussion of the conflict under the corporate law of Delaware and other 
states between corporate law provisions law granting shareholders the right to pass 
and amend by-laws and those granting the board of directors the power to manage 
the affairs of the corporation, see generally Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder 
Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205 
(2005). 
109 SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1547985, at *1 (June 5, 2006). 
110 Bebchuk v. CA, 2006 WL 1805545 (Del. Ch. June 22, 2006). 
111 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, 
975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999). 
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compensation representative by-law, since the two by-laws could be 
clearly distinguished.  Delaware General Corporation Law provides that 
by-laws “may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or the 
certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the 
conduct of its affairs, or the rights and powers of its stockholders, 
directors, officers or employees.”112 Unlike Bebchuk’s proposed by-law, a 
by-law merely calling for the appointment of a compensation 
representative could not be said to conflict with Section 141(a), since the 
representative would be explicitly precluded from managing the business 
or affairs of the corporation.  Neither would the by-law conflict with 
articles of incorporation that explicitly grant the compensation committee 
or the board of directors the authority to determine officer and director 
compensation.  After all, the compensation representative would not be a 
member of either the compensation committee or the board, nor would he 
or she have the authority to vote on the actual compensation being 
proposed.  He or she would merely represent the interests of shareholders 
and call to their attention compensation plans that shareholders might find 
objectionable.  The legality of a by-law calling for a compensation 
 
112 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §109(b). 
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representative is further strengthened by Section 141(h), which permits 
corporations to use by-laws to restrict the compensation of directors.113 
Once the by-law has been approved by the shareholders, no further 
legal issues should arise until a compensation representative objects to the 
board’s compensation plan and a shareholder submits a proxy proposal 
calling on the shareholders to reject it.  If the proxy proposal concerns a 
portion of the plan that is subject to a shareholder approval, there should 
be no legal hurdles to the proxy proposal, since the proposing shareholder 
would simply be exercising its right under the securities law.  Thus, for 
example, a shareholder could include a proxy proposal to reject an equity-
based compensation plan, since the listing rules of both the New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require that the shareholders approve any 
such plan.  Similarly, a shareholder could include a proxy proposal 
regarding any individual’s compensation in excess of  $1,000,000 for 
which the corporation wished claim a deduction under §162 (m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code.114 
More problematic would be a shareholder proxy proposal that 
purported either (i) to reject other portions of a compensation plan for 
 
113 “Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, the 
board of directors shall have the authority to fix the compensation of directors.” 
Del Code Ann. tit 8, §141(h) (emphasis supplied). 
114 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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which neither the tax law nor the exchange rules requires a shareholder 
vote, or (ii) to compel the corporation to adopt a specific compensation 
plan that had not already been proposed by the board. Whether or not a 
corporation could exclude such proxy proposals would depend upon state 
corporate law since, as discussed above, Rule 14a-8 allows a corporation to 
exclude any proposal that is invalid under the law of the corporation’s 
jurisdiction of organization. 
Therefore, the legality of a proposal to reject, for example, cash 
compensation under $1,000,000 would depend in Delaware on whether the 
corporate charter or by-laws permitted the shareholders to approve officer 
and director compensation in such a case.  Certainly, a corporation could 
amend its charter to require such a vote.  Under Delaware law, however, 
any charter amendment must be first initiated by the board, following 
which the shareholders must approve it,115 and it seems unlikely that many 
boards would unilaterally initiate charter amendments that subject their 
compensation decisions to a shareholder vote. As for by-law amendments, 
their terms are generally subordinate to contrary provisions in the 
charter.116 Thus, a shareholder could probably only initiate a by-law 
 
115 Del Code Ann. tit 8, § 242(b). 
116 See, e.g., Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 146 A.337, 340 (Del. Ch. 1929). 
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amendment to require a shareholder vote on executive compensation if the 
charter contained no contrary provision.117
The same problem would confront a proxy proposal purporting to 
compel the board to adopt a compensation plan containing specific terms.  
Such a proposal would not be valid unless a provision of the charter or by-
laws actually granted shareholders the right to dictate executive 
compensation, as opposed to simply granting them the right to approve a 
plan proposed by the board.  Presumably such a provision would be rare, 
certainly among listed companies, all of which are required under 
exchange rules to appoint compensation committees satisfying criteria 
specified by the relevant exchange.118 
Although a corporation could exclude a proxy proposal to reject 
certain portions of a pay package or to compel the board to adopt a 
particular compensation plan, a shareholder could still require the company 
to include a precatory proxy proposal.119 Some may be skeptical of the 
 
117 But, in view of the potential conflict of interest, it is not inconceivable that a 
court in equity could give preference to the by-laws.  See Gow v. Consolidated 
Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 138-142 (Del. Ch. 1933) (holding that a by-law 
determining the number of directors prevails over a contrary clause in the charter). 
118 See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.05(a). 
119 Since precatory proposals are not binding on the board, they are not deemed by 
the SEC to conflict with the requirement that the board have the authority to 
manage the affairs of the corporation.  “In our experience, most proposals that are 
cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified 
action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal 
drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company 
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effectiveness of precatory proposals, since they have tended not to garner 
significant shareholder support.  A study of such proposals in the 1994 
proxy season conducted by Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin found 
that precatory proposals relating to compensation garnered, on average, 
support of only 12.8%.120 However, precatory proposals submitted on the 
recommendation of the compensation representative should have greater 
credibility among shareholders than have past precatory proposals, which 
were often made by shareholders, such as unions or governmental actors, 
who held non-financial objectives.  Another empirical study by the same 
authors of the 1993-1997 proxy seasons found that shareholders are 
statistically more likely to support compensation proposals that raise 
corporate governance issues than those raising social responsibility 
issues.121 Still, one might wonder whether, if a precatory proposal were to 
pass, the board would act on it, since it has no legal obligation to do so.  
Yet Thomas and Martin’s study found that in the two-year period 
following such proposals total compensation declined by a statistically 
significant average of $2.7 million, although not a single proposal they 
 
demonstrates otherwise.”  Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by 
Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, at *7 
(Dec. 3, 1976). 
120 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed To Make 
Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 68 (1998). 
121 Thomas & Martin, supra note 35, at 1022. 
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studied actually passed.122 One can expect that a precatory proposal 
submitted following the report of a compensation representative to be at 
least as effective.  Indeed, such a precatory proposal, even if it do not pass, 
should be more effective than those studied by Thomas and Martin, since 
the board would realize that the proposal had the support of at least one 
major shareholder.  If such a precatory proposal were to pass, one could 
expect the impact to be even greater, especially if the precatory proposal 
were to be accompanied by the shareholders’ actual rejection of those 
portions of the compensation plan submitted for their approval.  In the face 
of such a rejection, a board would ignore the precatory proposal at its peril. 
As discussed above, one advantage of implementing the 
compensation representative system by by-law is that it would obviate the 
need for new legislation.  A related advantage to case-by-case 
implementation is flexibility, especially since the extent of the CEO 
compensation problem may vary greatly by firm.123 For example, at some 
 
122 Id. at 1065, quoted in PWP, supra note 4, at 68-69. 
123 For evidence that flexibility in matters of corporate can improve company 
performance, see Arcot, Sridhar R. and Bruno, Valentina Giulia, One Size Does 
Not Fit All, After All: Evidence from Corporate Governance (May 16, 2006). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=887947 (an empirical study finding 
that rigid adherence to “best practices” does not necessarily lead to superior 
performance, due to the heterogeneity of circumstances facing different 
companies).  See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director 
Independence Listing Standards, 30 Sec. Reg. L.J. 370, ____ (2002)(arguing that 
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firms, such as those controlled by a large independent shareholder, 
executive compensation may not be a serious issue, and the controlling 
shareholder may have the means and motivation to monitor executive 
compensation better than could a compensation representative.  Indeed, 
empirical studies have indicated that firms with a shareholder controlling 
more than 5% of the shares may already be engaged in significant 
monitoring,124 and that the doubling of the percentage holdings of large 
outside shareholdings is associated with a 12-14% drop in CEO pay.125 
Shareholders of such a firm might see no benefit to adding an additional 
layer of bureaucracy on top of an already well-working system. 
On the other hand, shareholders of an underperforming firm that is 
dominated, not by an outside shareholder, but by an unresponsive CEO and 
his or her complicit board of directors, may find that the executive 
compensation system lies at the heart of the company’s problems.  They 
 
independent directors are not an unalloyed good, in part because different 
companies may require different accountability mechanisms). 
 
124 See, e.g., Parthiban et al., supra note 101 (finding that the presence of 
institutional owners without significant business ties to a company is associated 
with lower levels of CEO pay); Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, The 
Effects of Ownership Structure on Conditions at the Top: The Case of CEO Pay 
Raises, 16 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175 (1995) (finding that the pay of CEOs at firms 
containing a large outside shareholders was tied significantly more strongly to 
profitability than was the case at firms without such a shareholder). 
125 Richard M. Cyert, Sok-Hyon Kang & Praveen Kumar, Corporate Governance, 
Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT.
SCI. 453 (2002), quoted in Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 660. 
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may discover that the introduction of a compensation representative both 
captures the attention and increases the accountability of the CEO and the 
board, to the substantial benefit of shareholders.  
In short, rather than mandating a procrustean system that could lead to 
unforeseen negative effects, the proposal set forth in this paper would give 
shareholders, the intended beneficiary of the new system, the ability to 
determine for themselves whether its adoption addresses their concerns.  If 
it does, the system will likely be adopted by numerous corporations, and 
may evolve into corporate best practice.  Indeed, if it became widely 
adopted, its benefits could be reflected in law subsequently.  For example, 
courts could adopt a different standard of review of executive 
compensation depending upon whether a compensation representative was 
involved.  Compensation plans involving a compensation representative 
could continue to enjoy the deferential waste standard or could be entirely 
immunized from judicial review, while plans adopted without such 
involvement could be subjected to a stricter scrutiny.  Or state corporate 
law could be amended to provide for compensation representatives in all 
cases, unless a company’s articles of incorporation explicitly opted-out of 
the system.126 In the unlikely event, however, that the use of compensation 
 
126 In a similar development, shareholder proposals seem to be affecting statutory 
law relating to the election of directors.  Currently, under the Delaware General 
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representatives provided no material shareholder benefit, additional 
corporations could refrain from adopting it, and those which had adopted it 
could repeal it by a simple shareholder vote, without the need of legislative 
or judicial action. 
 
CONCLUSION: RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
This paper concludes by addressing a few possible objections to the 
compensation representative proposal.  One objection might be that 
another layer of corporate bureaucracy is unnecessary, since most 
companies already have a compensation committee, along with a 
compensation consultant to advise them.  But as pointed out by Geaef 
Crystal, a compensation consultant and long-time critic of executive pay, 
the presence of a compensation consultant is no panacea.  Quite the 
contrary:  
 
Corporation Law and the Model Business Corporation Act, a nominee need only 
receive a plurality of shareholder votes to be elected to the board.  Recently, 
however, numerous corporations have received shareholder proposals to require 
the resignation of directors who receive less than a majority vote.  In response, the 
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association Section of 
Business Law has recently approved changes to the Model Business Corporation 
Act which would permit, among other things, the irrevocable resignation of a 
director who receives less than a specified shareholder vote.  See Changes in the 
Model Business Corporation Act – Proposed Amendments to Chapters 8 and 10 
Relating to Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors, 61 Bus. Law 399, 
421-23 (2006). 
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Ostensibly, compensation consultants were hired by the 
CEO to perform an objective analysis of the company’s 
executive pay package and to make whatever 
recommendations the consultant felt were appropriate.  In 
reality, if those recommendations did not cause the CEO to 
earn more money than he was earning before the 
compensation consultant appeared on the scene, the latter 
was rapidly shown the door.  I learned this fact of life 
early on.127 
One might argue that Crystal’s description no longer applies, since the 
listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange now require companies 
listed thereon to (i) have a compensation committee comprised entirely of 
independent directors, and (ii) to have a written charter that gives the 
compensation committee sole authority to retain and terminate any 
compensation consultant employed by the company.128 The mere fact, 
however, that a member of the compensation committee is independent for 
purposes of the exchange listing rules does not address another major 
problem with compensation consultants: the possibility of other, much 
larger contracts between the consultant and the company.  These contracts 
would be managed by the company’s human recourses department, under 
the control of the CEO rather than the compensation committee.  
Consultants would likely be very chary of jeopardizing these contracts by 
 
127 GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF 
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 218 (1991). 
128 Commentary to NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.05(b)(ii). 
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taking a tough line on CEO pay.   Hewitt Associates, a compensation 
consultant for Verizon Communications, provides a real-life example of 
the problem.  In its role as compensation consultant, it reports to the 
compensation committee of the board.  However, in its other consulting 
roles, it reports through the corporate hierarchy, and ultimately to the 
Verizon CEO.  In 2005 it assisted the compensation committee devise a 
CEO pay package worth $19.4 million, a 48% increase over that of 2004.  
Without passing judgment on whether such an increase was justified, in 
view of the 26% decline in Verizon stock over the same period, the fact 
that, since 1997, Hewitt Associates has received more than half a billion 
dollars in consulting revenue from Verizon and its predecessor companies 
does call into question its independence.129 One suspects that a 
compensation representative appointed by the major shareholders might 
have viewed such a pay package differently than either the compensation 
committee or its compensation consultant did.  
Others skeptics of compensation consultants might contend that it is 
unfair to give the three largest eligible shareholders a right not available to 
the other shareholders, i.e., the right to appoint the representative.  The 
large shareholders, however, would be entitled to appoint the 
 
129 See Gretchen Morgenson, Advice on Boss’s Pay May Not Be So Independent,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2006, at C1. 
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representative only if the majority of the shares voted to grant them that 
right.  There is no obvious reason to paternalistically deny shareholders the 
right to vote in line with their perceived best interests, especially since, as 
stated above, Delaware law allows the by-laws to contain any provision 
relating to the affairs of the corporation as long as the provision is not 
contrary to law or the company’s certificate of incorporation.130
In any event, there is a practical reason to place the right to appoint the 
representative in the hands of large shareholders; namely, there is no good 
alternative.  Even if the representative were appointed by a vote of all of 
the shareholders, someone would first have to nominate the candidate.  
Giving the nomination right to the board would defeat the purpose of 
employing a compensation representative, since the representative would 
then be neither more nor less accountable to the shareholders than are 
other board members, who are also nominated by the board and elected by 
the shareholders.  If every shareholder, regardless of the size of its 
holdings, were permitted to nominate a candidate, shareholders with only a 
small economic stake in the corporation might abuse the compensation 
representative to further their own political or other non-financial agenda.  
If only those shareholders who held, say, 5% of the outstanding shares 
were allowed to nominate, compensation representatives could never be 
 
130 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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nominated for companies which did not have any large shareholders – 
precisely the sort of companies in which, as discussed above, a 
compensation representative could be most useful.  Also, if there were 
multiple 5% shareholders who each nominated competing candidates, 
smaller shareholders would have difficulty making an informed decision 
between them.  
One possibility would be to permit the three largest eligible 
shareholders jointly to nominate a single candidate, subject to the approval 
of the shareholders.  But since the purpose of adopting the compensation 
representative system would be to ensure the appointment of a party 
independent of the board of directors, the board could not be allowed to 
nominate an alternative.  As a result, the shareholder vote would devolve 
into the empty formality of electing a candidate without opposition.  
Having said that, if shareholders wanted to include a voting procedure into 
the by-law adopting compensation representatives, there is no obvious 
policy reason (other than a desire for simplicity) to prohibit it.  
Other skeptics might suspect that large shareholders would not be 
willing to participate in the compensation representative system, since the 
costs to such shareholders would exceed the benefits.  The total costs to 
participating shareholders, however, would be trivial.  Out-of-pocket costs 
would be close to zero, since fees for the compensation representative 
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would be paid by the corporation.  Likewise, the costs of searching for an 
appropriate representative should be quite low, particularly for institutional 
shareholders that repeatedly appoint the same representatives for the 
various corporations in their portfolio.  Costs in time and effort should also 
be low, since the actual tasks relating to reviewing, discussing, and if 
necessary amending the compensation plans would be delegated to the 
compensation representative.  The only significant task required of 
participating shareholders would be to respond in those limited instances 
in which a compensation representative has objected to the board’s final 
compensation determination.  
Given the low costs to participating shareholders, even modest benefits 
would be sufficient to justify the use of compensation representatives.  In 
fact, the potential benefits to shareholders could be significant.  First, 
compensation representatives would provide a means of objectively 
evaluating whether a CEO’s pay is excessive.  When they find that a  pay 
package is inappropriate, compensation representatives could suggest 
improvements to the package before it is even submitted to the board.  
Thus, they would be more efficacious than the newly mandated disclosure 
rules, which merely require corporations to better inform shareholders 
about a fait accompli. Second, if the use of a compensation representative 
led to lower CEO pay at a given company, one could expect the pay of 
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other high-ranking executives at the company to decrease proportionally -- 
hardly a trivial consideration when the top five executives are receiving 
9.8% of all corporate earnings.131 Third, oversight by compensation 
representatives could improve the alignment between executive pay and 
performance, thereby potentially enhancing shareholder returns by 
reducing agency costs.  Fourth, even if compensation representatives 
brought only minor benefits for any individual company, they could, if 
widely employed, provide substantial benefits to diversified institutional 
investors, which could enjoy lower executive pay and better alignment 
between pay and performance for each company in their portfolios.  
Finally, compensation representatives could have a substantial 
prophylactic benefit for investors.  At a bare minimum, they could help put 
an end to the “ratcheting effect” by which CEO pay might otherwise 
continue indefinitely to increase without obstruction.  This possibility 
alone should be enough to encourage investors to consider introducing 
compensation representatives, a prudent solution to excessive CEO pay. 
 
131 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra, note 7. 
 
